

DCID 1/7 file  
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DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**  
COMPARTMENTATION SUBCOMMITTEE

30 NOV 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

SUBJECT: DCID 1/7, Use of Control Markings

1. In response to your tasking of 14 September 1976 (SECOM-M-196), the subcommittee chairman appointed an Ad Hoc Working Group to discuss the problem of control marking proliferation and to recommend solutions for consideration by the members. The report of the Working Group was approved by all participating members of the Compartmentation Subcommittee. It should be noted that SCI control markings were not considered and are not part of the recommendations.

2. The Subcommittee concludes that DCID 1/7, as written, provides adequate guidance.

3. Accordingly, the Subcommittee recommends that:

a. The Security Committee advise all members of the intelligence community that they must review the control markings on all foreign intelligence documents for conformity with DCID 1/7 before they are released to other agencies and departments.

b. The Security Committee inform all agencies and departments that intelligence community libraries will recognize only those control markings set forth in DCID 1/7.

c. All agencies and departments of the intelligence community provide the Security Committee with copies of their DCID 1/7 implementation instructions. The name and telephone number of each agency's designated "primary referent," as requested in paragraph 6d of DCID 1/7, should also be provided.

4. Chairman's comment: A glossary of various internal agency caveats and markings, as an attachment to DCID 1/7, could serve the purpose of defining meanings and intent without requiring additional community markings.



Russell T. Newman  
Chairman  
Colonel, USAF

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APPROVAL		DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT		FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION	SIGNATURE
<b>Remarks:</b> <i>Jack -</i> <i>The attached memo</i> <i>and comments are</i> <i>self-explanatory -</i> <i>Don</i> <i>1-2: Copy sent to D/Os For info</i>			
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1	DD/CRS			EWM	
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3	C/AS <sup>R</sup>		29 OCT 1976		
4	Kelly should get copy of Gambino!				
5					
6					
ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY	
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COMMENT		FILE		RETURN	
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<b>Remarks:</b> <p>In view of Betsy's last paragraph, perhaps a copy of the attached should be sent to Gambino who, I think, is the official CIA representative to the Security Committee.</p> <p style="text-align: right;">Bob E.</p>					
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER					
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.				DATE	
O/CH/DSG 1E4816 HQ.				28 OCT 1976	
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26 October 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Reference Service

FROM :   
Acting Chief, Document Services Branch

VIA : Chief, Document Services Group  
Chief, Central Libraries Division *WLC*

SUBJECT : Community Use of Dissemination Controls

REFERENCE : C/DSG's memorandum to Chairman, NFIB Security  
Committee, dtd 2 July 1976

1. The NFIB Security Committee compartmentation Subcommittee Ad Hoc Working Group, formed to examine the scope of the problem relating to CRS concern over the Community use of dissemination controls, held its first meeting on 19 October. In the absence of the C/DSG,  and I attended the meeting to answer questions that might be raised.

2. Prior to the meeting I determined that the Working Group's Chairman had not seen the referenced memorandum. I suggested it might be beneficial to the committee if I brought reproduced copies to the meeting. Once fully aware of the problem the Working Group was immediately sympathetic to the situation. Several of those present had participated in the preparation of DCID 1/7, Control of Dissemination of Foreign Intelligence, dtd 5 October 1975. They were rather surprised to discover that the DCID's implementation by various organizations had not followed the intent that the dissemination controls of DCID 1/7 were to be the only controls used for community dissemination, and any internal controls used within an Agency were to be ignored once a document was released to another Agency. They were amazed that the implementing instructions had obviously been unclear, but they felt it would not be difficult to make the necessary clarification. They never intended to transfer a classification burden to those concerned with document indexing and retrieval. It became apparent that some of the examples of the improper use of dissemination controls could be traced to the delay in receipt of implementing instructions by DoD components. Many felt these were one of a kind examples that were not repeated once the instructions were known. There was general agreement that the ORCON control was appropriate for many of the unique Department of State controls that have caused so much confusion to the Community.

SUBJECT: Community Use of Dissemination Controls

3. It looks like the Working Group will recommend the following:

--that the NFIB Security Committee put out a piece of paper indicating that only the DCID 1/7 dissemination controls apply and all others can be ignored

--that each intelligence agency submit its DCID 1/7 implementing instructions to the NFIB Security Committee

These actions should place a limit so to speak on the number of dissemination controls to be used in the Community and eliminate the necessity to constantly modify codes used to represent these controls in any automated data bases. When these steps are accomplished the problems that concerned CRS should be minimized. The mood of the Working Group seemed to indicate that very little time would be needed to make their recommendations.

4. The absence of any CIA representative on the Working Group was both obvious and disappointing in view of the fact that a problem surfaced by a CIA component was under consideration at the Community level.

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